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Abstract
We study market entry decisions when firms have private information
about their profitability. We generalize current models by allowing general
forms of market competition and heterogeneous firms that self-select when
entering the market. Post-entry profits depend on market structure, and on
the identities and the private information of the entering firms. We introduce
a notion of the firm’s strength and show that an equilibrium where players’
strategies are ranked by strength, or herculean equilibrium, always exists.
Moreover, when profits are elastic enough with respect to the firm’s private
information, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game.
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Introduction

Understanding firms’ entry decisions is essential in economics. Entry determines
market structure, which directly affects prices and welfare. When deciding whether
to enter a market, firms base their decisions on the market’s observable characteristics, including the number of (potential) competitors and their technology, as well
as their own private characteristics (e.g., marginal costs). Lacking a general theory
that incorporates heterogeneous public and private firm characteristics, structural
analysis has traditionally modeled entry decisions as a complete information game.
It has been assumed that: (i) all information is known before entering (á la Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991) or, (ii) firms learn some private information only after entry
has occurred (á la Levin and Smith, 1994). These assumptions turn market entry
into a coordination problem which commonly leads to multiple equilibria (Tamer,
2003). Multiplicity weakens identification, precluding the possibility of performing
robust counterfactual analysis (Berry and Reiss, 2007).
Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016) argue that, in addition to multiplicity, complete information entry models are restrictive and could produce biased counterfactuals. These models cannot account for firms self-selecting when entering the
market, i.e., they are unable to account that more efficient firms are more likely
to enter the market. Since the seminal work by Seim (2006), recent work have incorporated private information in firms’ entry decisions. This literature introduces
private information as an additive shocks to profits. When the private shock is
interpreted as an entry or sunk cost, there can be no self-selection.
In this article, we examine the question of equilibrium uniqueness in a general
class of entry games under private information. The model allows for diverse forms
of firm heterogeneity and equilibrium outcomes in which firms may self-select when
entering the market. To facilitate characterization of the firms’ entry strategies,
we propose a simple index, called strength, which summarizes a firm’s capacity
to endure competition. The use of strength in entry games is similar to the use
of a Gittins index in multi-armed bandit games (Gittins, 1979) as it summarizes
the game’s relevant information, facilitating the search for equilibria. Unlike the
Gittins index, which summarizes information in a single-agent context, strength
summarizes information in a n-firm game using the public characteristics of every
potential entrant. We show that the entry game always has an equilibrium where
strategies are ordered according to strength, or herculean equilibrium. Strength reduces the computing power necessary to find equilibria and estimate entry models.
2

In particular, when there are n potential entrants, there are n! possible rankings
for firms’ entry strategies; strength reduces this problem to the computation of n
simple indexes.
Our main contribution is to identify a sufficient condition that guarantees the
uniqueness of equilibrium in the entry game. The sufficient condition aids in the
empirical identification of the model and broades the scope of the applications in
which market entry can be studied. The condition is easy to verify and requires that
payoffs are stable under small changes in the firms’s private information. We show
that our sufficient condition is not too demanding as it also guarantees well-behaved
comparative statics in the entry model. Similarly to monotone virtual valuations in
mechanism design à la Myerson (1981), our sufficient condition establishes whether
the entry game is sufficiently regular.
The proposed model allows for flexible forms of firm heterogeneity and rich
strategic interactions. Firms may differ in their public characteristics, including
those that are unobserved by the econometrician (as in Li et al., 2016). To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first model that can handle situations in which
firms are not uniformly ranked in terms of their competitiveness. For example, our
framework incorporate situations in which a subset of firms have larger (publicly
observed) entry costs but are likely to have lower (privately observed) marginal
cost than another set of competitors. Private information adds an extra layer
of heterogeneity. Payoffs may not only depend on the opponents’ actions but,
conditional on entry, payoffs may also depend the opponents’ private information in
non-linear ways. For example, if firms are privately informed about their marginal
costs of production, facing a competitor with lower marginal costs will harm a
firm’s profitability. The magnitude of this effect will depend (non-linearly) on
the firm’s marginal costs, the elasticity of demand, the number of entrants and
their degree of product substitutability. Our framework accommodates post-entry
competition in price, quantity, quality, and follower-leader scenarios, among others.
One of the central topics in Industrial Organization is to understand the determinants of market structure and its consequences for welfare. Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) studied entry in a model of homogeneous agents with complete
information.1 Levin and Smith (1994), studying an auction setting, examined the
case in which firms are ex-ante homogeneous but learn their valuations only after entering the market; i.e, firms are ex-ante identical when taking their entry
1
In order to avoid confusion we use the expressions (hetero)homogeneous to refer to firms’
ex-ante characteristics, whereas (a)symmetric is used to refer to firms’ strategies.
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decision, but heterogeneous ex-post. Brock and Durlauf (2001) is closer to our
approach as they examine a model in which privately-informed agents choose a
binary action. Our modeling shares the idea that both the action and the type of
an agent affect the payoffs of other agents. Our analyses differ in that we examine
a context in which entry decisions are strategic substitutes and in that we allow for
ex-ante heterogeneous firms.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992) developed the first models of market entry that explicitly accounted for the strategic interaction between
post-entry market competition and firms’ entry decisions. When firms are perfectly
informed about market outcomes, the entry game often contains multiple equilibria. Berry (1992) shows that if the heterogeneity among the firms is limited, partial
identification can be achieved. In contrast, our private-information model can handle any source of heterogeneity. Although Sweeting (2009) argued that multiplicity
of equilibria may help with the model’s identification in games without outside options, Tamer (2003) showed that, without further assumptions, multiple equilibria
usually lead to set, rather than point, identification. Seim (2006) showed numerically that private information may solve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria.
However, Berry and Tamer (2006) constructed examples of multiple equilibria under private information, raising the question of when uniqueness can be achieved.
We contribute to this discussion by identifying sufficient conditions that guarantee
equilibrium uniqueness in entry games under private information.
Models of perfect information are intended to understand long-run equilibrium
outcomes, where ex-post regret is unlikely. Our framework is especially useful in
settings where there is both substantial private information and substantial entry
costs, so that ex-post regret is likely to arise in the medium term. Private information is particularly important in dynamic settings with information shocks over
time as in Ericson and Pakes (1995). Grieco (2014) showed that, in practice, part of
the observed heterogeneity comes from private information—marginal costs, contracts with suppliers, and managerial ability—that firms possess at the moment of
making their entry decisions. Moreover, he showed that omitting private information from the model can lead to qualitatively different results. In the same spirit,
Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2016), using the notion of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
(Bergemann and Morris, 2013, 2016), rejected the idea that their data is generated
by a process of complete information. Our contribution is to provide a framework
that allows for private information under rich forms of strategic interactions. The
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framework allows for firm heterogeneity in both their observable characteristics as
well as in their distribution of unobservable characteristics (private information).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3
defines and discusses the notions of firm strength and herculean equilibrium. Section 4 studies the case with two potential entrants. We show that the existence of a
herculean equilibrium is guaranteed and provide a sufficient condition for when the
herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game. Section 5 extends the
analysis to cases with more than two firms in contexts that often arise in empirical
applications. Section 6 discusses extensions of our model and Section 7 concludes.

2

A Model of Market Entry

Consider n firms simultaneously deciding on whether to enter a market. Each firm
possesses private information about its profitability upon entering the market.
The post-entry profits of firm i depend on every firm entry decision, i’s private
information vi ∼ Fi (scalar), and the private information of the entering firms.
We assume that the draws of private information are independent across firms
but not (necessarily) identically distributed. In particular, we assume that each
firm i is endowed with a distribution function Fi that is atomless and continuously
differentiable with full support on R.2
Let ei ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator function that takes the value 1 if firm i enters
the market. Denote by e = (e1 , e2 , . . . , en ) the vector of ex-post entry decisions, we
also refer to e as the (realized) market structure. Define Ei = {e : ei = 1} be the
set of all possible market structures in which firm i enters. For a given vector of
entry decisions e, define I(e) = {i : ei = 1} to be the set of firms participating in
market e. Similarly, define Ii (e) = {j 6= i : ej = 1} and Oi (e) = {j 6= i : ej = 0}
to be the set of i’s competitors that are in and out of the market under structure
e, respectively. Define v = (v1 , v2 , . . . , vn ) to be the vector containing the draws of
private information (signals) of every firm. Similarly, v−i represents the draws of
private information of every firm except firm i; and ve ≡ (vk )k∈I(e) is the vector of
draws of every firm participating in market e.
With a slight abuse of notation, let πi (ve ) be a real valued function representing
firm i’s profits of entering the market when the realized vector of private informa2

All our results would go through if the support of Fi were any interval [a, b] with a < b. The
current formulation is used for consistency with the literature.
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tion is v and the realized market structure is e. To illustrate the workings of the
notation observe that πi (vi ) represents firm i’s profit when its private information
is vi and i is the only firm entering the market. Similarly, πi (v) = πi (vi , v−i )
represents i’s profit when every potential firm enters the market and the vector
of private information is given by v. By adopting this notation we assume that
the private information of non-entering firms is payoff irrelevant. In addition, we
assume that a firm that does not enter receives zero profit, that the profit function
is integrable with respect to ve under any market structure e, and that the expectation of the profit function with respect to the distribution of private information
is finite. Also, since we only require differentiability of πi (ve ) with respect to vi , we
use πi0 (ve ) to denote such derivative. Conditional on i’s entry (ei = 1), we assume
that πi (ve ) satisfies the following properties.
(A1) Monotonicity: πi (ve ) is strictly increasing and differentiable in vi ;
i.e., πi0 (ve ) > 0 for all vi and ve\i .3
Assumption A1 gives economic meaning to the private information, vi . Upon
entering the market, and regardless of the realized market structure e, firms’ profits are increasing in vi . In terms of traditional competition models, higher vi
can represent lower marginal cost of production, higher product quality, or higher
managerial ability. A1 excludes, for instance, Bertrand competition under homogeneous goods, but not under heterogeneous goods. In the former case, firms may
have profits that are only weakly increasing with respect to their own marginal
costs and the profit function may not be differentiable everywhere.4
(A2) Competition: For each j ∈ Oi (e), πi (ve ) is weakly decreasing in ej .
For each j ∈ Ii (e), πi (ve ) is weakly decreasing in vj .
Assumption A2 concerns how competition affects profitability. In general terms,
it states that firm i’s profits decrease with competition, i.e., πi (ve ) decreases with
entry and higher draws of private information by competitors. From the firm’s perspective, A2 implies that firms’ entry decisions are strategic substitutes and that
the degree of substitutability increases with higher draws of private information
from a rival. A2 is a minimal assumption on competition.
Finally, to ensure an interior solution we add a third assumption. With a slight
3

For any e ∈ Ei , e \ i denotes the vector e but with a zero in the ith position. Similarly, for
any firm j ∈ Oi (e), e ∪ j denotes the vector e but with a one in the jth position.
4
Our results are still valid under a weaker version of monotonicity that includes homogenous Bertrand competition. For brevity, clarity in exposition, and because it encompasses most
applications, we choose to present the results under A1.
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abuse of notation we define φi (ve ) =

Q

j∈Ii (e)

fj (vj ) to be joint density of the private

information of i’s competitors under market structure e.
(A3) Interior: There exists values v i < v̄i such that πi (v i ) = 0 and
Z

πi (v̄i , v−i )φi (v−i )dn−1 v−i > 0.

Rn−1

where the integral is over each of the n − 1 dimensions of v−i .
Assumption A3 concerns the entry problem. The value v i represents the minimal draw of private information required to incentivize a monopolist to enter the
market. Jointly with A2, the first part of A3 implies that no firm would choose
to enter the market, regardless of market structure, when its draw (or private information) is sufficiently low (vi < v i ). For this condition to hold, a monopolist
should be able to obtain negative post-entry profits. Observe that, because entry
costs are incorporated into π(·), post-entry profits can be negative even under the
assumption of non-negative variable profits, as firms may always choose not to
produce and obtain zero variable profits. The second part of A3 states that any
firm may enter the market if its draw of private information is sufficiently high. In
particular, there exists a value v̄i such that drawing vi > v̄i ensures entry regardless
of whether every competitor decides to enter the market.
The timing of the game is as follows. Before making any entry decision, each
firm privately observes vi . After observing vi and without observing v−i , each
firm independently and simultaneously decides whether to enter the market. After
entry decisions are made, market structure e is realized and each firm entering the
market gets a payoff πi (ve ). The tuple (πi , Fi )ni=1 —which includes the number of
potential entrants n—is commonly known by all the firms in the market.5
An entry strategy for firm i is a mapping from the firm’s private information vi
to a probability of entering in the market τi : R → [0, 1]. We assume that the strategy of player i is an integrable function with respect to its own type vi . We study
the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the entry game. Denote by τ = (τ1 , τ2 , . . . , τn )
the vector of entry strategies. Given a strategy profile τ , the expected profits
of firm i after drawing the private information vi but before entry decisions are
5

The model also accommodates partially informed firms, where firms first obtain a private
signal about their market profitability and only after entry, do they become fully informed (see
Section 6).
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realized is
"
Πi (vi , τ ) = τi (vi )

X Z
e∈Ei

πi (ve ) Pr[e|τ−i , v−i ]φi (v)dn−1 v−i

#
(1)

Rn−1

where Pr[e|τ−i , v−i ] is the probability of observing market structure e, given the
vector of strategies τ−i and the realization of private information v−i . The integral
is over each of the n − 1 dimensions of the private information of firm i’s competitors, v−i . Conditional on i’s entry, which occurs with probability τi (vi ), the
expected profits of firm i consist on the expected sum of profits that firm i would
get under each feasible market structure, which is induced by the vector of strategies τ and the realization of private information v, integrated over all possible
realizations of the competitors’ private information.
The model allows for general forms of firm heterogeneity. First, firms can differ in their distribution of private information Fi . For instance, firms’ may have
publicly-known production technologies but have private contracts with (potentially different) suppliers. Or, firms could be located in different regions and thus
their production is affected by local shocks. Perhaps more importantly, the model
allows for firm heterogeneity in the profit function πi (ve ). As noted above, this
formulation can accommodate firms with different entry costs. These can represent
models in which firms make complementary investments or incur sunk entry costs,
in which firms enter the market with different production capacities, or in which
firms locate at various distances from some exogenously given market location.
Also, the model allows for heterogeneity in the way firms compete after entry has
occurred. In particular, the general form of the functions πi (ve ) accommodates
situations in which firms compete with heterogeneous products and have different
production capacities. The model can accommodate the existence of dominant
firms, or even a predetermined order of play in the post-entry market, such as,
competition à la Stackelberg.
The proposed formulation of πi (ve ) does have some restrictions on the nature
of post-entry competition. First, πi (ve ) is a function rather than a correspondence,
which imposes that either the post-entry game has a unique equilibrium or, under
multiplicity of post-entry equilibria, the equilibria are payoff equivalent or that
there is a market consensus about which equilibrium will be played. Another,
subtler, restriction is the fact that πi (ve ) does not depend on the strategy profile
τ . A natural interpretation for the model is that entering firms’ private informa8

tion becomes public after entry occurs but before firms compete in the product
market. As a consequence, firms carry no beliefs about their competitors’ private
information when playing in the post-entry game. Another interpretation is that
no private information is revealed after entry and πi (ve ) is only observed at the end
of the game. To see why the omission of τ in πi (ve ) is restrictive, consider the case
in which ve remains private in the post-entry game but the market structure e is
observed. In such scenario firms will base their strategies in the post-entry game on
their beliefs about the private information of their competitors. Through Bayesian
updating, these beliefs would depend on the strategy profile τ and the observed
market structure e, making it part of the post-entry profit function. Although
important, the analysis of such models lie outside of the scope of this article.

3

Preliminaries

In this section we provide a general characterization of all equilibria in the entry
game and establish the existence of equilibrium. It is shown that, without loss
of generality, we can restrict attention to cutoff strategies. Then, using the cutoff
structure of equilibria, we introduce two key definitions—firm strength and herculean equilibrium—for the main results in Sections 4 and 5. We provide intuitions
on the nature of these constructions.

3.1

Characterization of Equilibria

Definition (Cutoff Strategy). A strategy τi (vi ) is called cutoff if there exists a
threshold x > 0 such that
(
τi (vi ) =

1 if vi ≥ x
0 if vi < x

.

A cutoff strategy specifies whether a firm enters a market with certainty depending on whether its private information is above or below some given threshold.
In any best response, there exists a draw of private information, vi , that makes a
firm indifferent between entering the market, or not. We break this indifference
by assuming that firms enter. For a cutoff strategy, this means that a firm enters
when its draw of private information is equal to its cutoff. Given a vector τ−i ,
a best response is given by the strategy τ̂i that maximizes (1) at every value of
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vi . A (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium, is thus defined by a vector of strategies τ in
which every firm best respond to each other. The next proposition establishes the
existence of equilibrium and that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our
analysis to cutoff strategies.
Proposition 0. For any game (πi , Fi )ni=1 there exists an equilibrium. For any
vector τ−i , firm i’s best response is a cutoff strategy. Therefore, every equilibrium
of the game is in cutoff strategies.
Existence follows from Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. The restriction to cutoff
strategies is quite intuitive: regardless of which strategy competitors are playing,
assumption A1 implies that firm i’s expected profit is strictly increasing in its
private information. Because i’s expected profit is linear in its entry probability
(see eq. (1)), i either prefers to enter with certainty when it is profitable to do so,
or to stay out otherwise.
We abuse notation and denote a cutoff strategy by the cutoff itself. In particular, from now on xi ∈ R represents the cutoff valuation under which, if vi ≥ xi ,
the firm enters the market. We also simplify notation by writing πi (vi , ve ) instead

of πi vi , ve\i when the context leads to no ambiguity. Let ne represent the number of firms entering under market structure e. For a vector of cutoff strategies
x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ), define the function



Z ∞

X Y

πi (xi , ve ) φi (ve )dne −1 ve\i
Hi (x) ≡
Fj (xj )


(xj )j∈I (e)
e∈Ei

j∈Oi (e)

(2)

i

where the integral is across each of the ne −1 dimensions of ve\i .6 The next Lemma
characterizes all cutoff equilibria.
Lemma 1. The vector x of cutoff strategies constitutes an equilibrium if and only
if Hi (x) = 0 for each firm i.
Lemma 1 characterizes every equilibrium of the entry game. The function
Hi (vi , x−i ) represents firm i’s expected profit of entering the market when it draws
the private information vi and the opponents play the vector of cutoffs x−i . Firm
i’s best response to x−i is defined by a cutoff xi equal to the value of vi that
satisfies Hi (vi , x−i ) = 0. A profile of equilibrium cutoffs x is, thus, constructed
6

R

The following notation conventions are used throughout the article:
a
= a.
∅
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P

∅ = 0,

Q

∅ = 1, and

by the collection of functions Hj (x) evaluated at a point in which every firm j is
indifferent between entering the market when drawing private information xj .
Lemma 2. The function Hi is differentiable, strictly increasing in xi , and weakly
increasing in xj .
Lemma 2 connects cutoff strategies with the nature of competition in the entry
game. When a firm chooses a higher cutoff, it increases its expected payoff upon
entry, but enters the market with lower probability. Similarly, when a competitor
of firm i increases its entry cutoff, xj , firm i faces less expected competition, leading
to an increase in i’s expected payoff.

3.2

Strength and Herculean Equilibrium

In general, there might be multiple equilibria (see Section 4.1 for an example).
The lemmas above provide little information about which firm plays which cutoff,
and the number of equilibria in the entry game. The next definition, which ranks
players according to a summary of the game fundamentals in their willingness to
enter the market, is instrumental in characterizing the entry game further and
establishing conditions for the uniqueness of an equilibrium.
Definition (Firm Strength). For a given game (πi , Fi )ni=1 , let σi (s) ≡ Hi (s, . . . , s).
The strength of player i is the unique number si ∈ R that solves σi (si ) = 0; i.e.,



Z ∞

X Y
ne −1


σi (si ) =
Fj (si )
πi (si , ve ) φi (ve )d
ve\i = 0.


(si )j∈I (e)
e∈Ei

j∈Oi (e)

i

We say that firm i is stronger than firm j if si < sj .
Lemma 3. σi (s) is strictly increasing and single crosses zero.
Lemma 3 shows that strength is well defined, assigning a unique scalar si to
each firm i and, therefore, delivering a complete ranking of the firms. In words,
strength ranks firms by finding the cutoff si that firm i would play under the
assumption that all firms play the same cutoff si . Intuitively, strength ranks firms
according to their ability to endure competition. Firm i being stronger than firm j
(si < sj ) indicates that firm i, facing more competition than j, needs lower draws
of private information than j to enter the market. This observation motivates our
next definition.
11

Definition (Herculean Equilibrium). An equilibrium is called herculean if the
equilibrium cutoffs are ordered by strength, with stronger players playing lower
cutoffs.
Intuitively, because stronger firms are more able to endure competition, they
should be more inclined to enter the market than weaker firms. Therefore, an
equilibrium in which cutoffs are ordered by strength should naturally emerge in
entry games. We show in Proposition 1 that this is indeed the case, and that,
under certain conditions, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of
the game. The next definition and corollary will help us motivate and to convey
intuitions behind our focus on herculean equilibria.
Definition (Homogeneous entry game). An entry game is homogeneous when
every firm i has homogeneous CDFs: Fi (vi ) = F (vi ) for all i and vi ; and, homogeneous and anonymous profit functions: πi (vi , ve\i ) = π(vi , vpermi (e\i) ) for all i
where vpermi (e) is any permutation that fixes the realizations in ve but changes the
identities of the entering firms in e excluding the identity of firm i.
Homogeneous games correspond to the private-information analogue of complete information models à la Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991). In the context
of incomplete information, homogeneous-firms models have been studied by Brock
and Durlauf (2001), Seim (2006) and Sweeting (2009), among others. It is important to observe that even if firms are ex-ante homogeneous, particular realizations
of firms’ private information can produce outcomes in which firms are ex-post heterogeneous. In homogeneous games the focus is usually restricted to symmetric
equilibrium. The next corollary makes explicit the connection between herculean
and symmetric equilibrium.
Corollary 1. If firms are equally strong (i.e., si = s for all i), there exists a
unique herculean equilibrium. In this equilibrium every firm plays cutoffs equal to
their strength (xi = s for all i). In particular, when the game is homogeneous, the
(unique) herculean equilibrium and the symmetric equilibrium coincide.7
Herculean equilibrium aims to extend the idea of symmetric equilibrium to
games with heterogeneous agents; i.e., to construct an asymmetric analogue of the
symmetric equilibrium. We do so by ranking firms in terms of their strength, which
7
Notice that the result applies trivially to games with homogeneous firms, where firms have
the same strength by construction, but also to games with heterogeneous firms when they simply
happen to have the same strength.
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summarize each firm’s ability to endure competition by using the notion of symmetric strategies. In games with homogeneous firms, every firm is equally strong.
Thus, the notions of strength, herculean equilibrium and symmetric equilibrium
coincide. We show that herculean equilibria possess some desirable properties. Its
existence is guaranteed, under certain conditions it is the only equilibrium of the
game, and the cutoff order prescribed among firms is intuitive.
The uniqueness result in Corollary 1 follows from strength being uniquely defined. Because strength and the herculean cutoffs coincide when firms are equally
strong, there is a unique herculean/symmetric equilibrium in the entry game. Note,
however, that non-herculean equilibria may still exist.

4

Two Potential Entrants

To convey our intuition, we begin studying a market with two potential entrants.
Section 5 extends the analysis to scenarios likely to arise in applied work under n
potential competitors. We show that herculean equilibria always exist and establish
a general sufficient condition for equilibrium uniqueness. Then we proceed to
link our condition with models used in empirical applications. Finally, we study
comparative statics of the entry game.

4.1

Herculean Equilibria: Existence and Uniqueness

Let ∆i (vi , vj ) ≡ πi (vi ) − πi (vi , vj ) be firm i’s profit loss under private information
vi when firm j enters the market with private information vj , i.e., the difference
between monopoly and duopoly profits. In what follows, firms are ordered by
strength, with firm 1 being the strongest firm in the game. Recall (from A3) that
v i is the minimum value under which firm i enters the market.
Proposition 1. In any entry game (πi , Fi )2i=1 , an herculean equilibrium always
exists and is characterized by cutoffs x1 ≤ x2 that solve Hi (x1 , x2 ) = 0; i.e.,
Z

∞

πi (xi )Fj (xj ) +

πi (xi , y) dFj (y) = 0.
xj

Moreover, the entry game has a unique equilibrium if for every firm i, all vi > v i ,
and all vj > v j
∆i (vi , vj ) fi (vi )
< 1.
πi0 (vi ) Fi (vi )
13

(3)

Figure 1: Strength and Herculean equilibrium
Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of herculean equilibria, confirming the
intuition that this type of equilibria emerges naturally. Figure 1 depicts the construction of a herculean equilibrium. Consider the functions σ1 (s) and σ2 (s) defining the strength of each firm. Firm 1 is stronger than firm 2 as s1 < s2 . By
Lemma 3, σi (s) is strictly increasing, crossing the horizontal axis once, at s1 and
s2 respectively. At s2 , σ2 (s2 ) = 0 and firm 2 breaks even when both firms play
the cutoff strategy s2 ; i.e., when xi = s2 for all i. Since σ1 (s2 ) > 0, however, firm
1 gets positive expected profits, so this cannot be an equilibrium. Because profits
are increasing in the firm’s private information, in equilibrium firm 1 plays a lower
cutoff, so that x1 < s2 . Observe that x1 < s2 implies that firm 2 is facing more
competition than what it would face at its strength cutoff s2 . Consequently, firm
2 responds by increasing its own cutoff above s2 , so that s2 < x2 . This establishes
that when x1 < s2 we must have x2 > s2 .
Similarly, at s1 , σ1 (s1 ) = 0 and firm 1 breaks even when both firms play the
cutoff strategy s1 , i.e., when xi = s1 for all i. Since σ2 (s1 ) < 0, however, firm 2 gets
negative expected profits, so this cannot be an equilibrium. Because profits are
increasing in the firm’s private information, in equilibrium firm 2 plays a higher
cutoff, so that x2 > s1 . Observe that x2 > s1 implies that firm 1 is facing less
competition than what it would face at its strength cutoff s1 . Consequently, firm
1 responds by reducing its own cutoff below s1 , so that x1 < s1 whenever x2 > s1 .
Therefore, by the construction above and assumption A3, we must have a pair
(x1 , x2 ) such that x1 < s1 < s2 < x2 ; where the equilibrium thresholds are always
further away from each other than the values of strength. Hence, there always exists
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Table 1: Examples

Firm 2

In
Out

Firm 1
In
v1 − δ1 , v2 − δ2
v1 , 0

Out
0, v2
0, 0

Notes. (a) In examples 1, 2, and 3: δi = δ for all i. (b) Profit ranking: δ1 = 1/4 and δ2 = 1/6.

an equilibrium where cutoffs are ordered by strength, i.e., an herculean equilibrium.
The argument above does not preclude the existence of multiple herculean equilibria, or of non-herculean equilibria. Another contribution of Proposition 1 is to
provide a sufficient condition under which the herculean equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium of the entry game, which is a stability condition. It guarantees that
the gain in firm i’s profit induced by an increase in its own cutoff xi cannot be
overcome by any response by the competitor’s cutoff xj .8 Condition (3) uses only
information with respect to each firm i, but it has to hold for every firm in the
market. Also, it is sufficient to check the condition only where entry is feasible—
where vk > v k for k ∈ {1, 2}—as deviations for valuations below the minimal entry
cutoff v k are always outside the equilibrium path.
To illustrate Proposition 1, consider the next three examples using the entry
game described in Table 1 under the assumptions that firms are homogeneous
(Fi (v) = F (v) and δi = δ) and δ > 0. These examples corresponds to typeindependent extensive margin models (case B in Table 2) which have been the
focus of most of the empirical literature. In this model, condition (3) becomes
f (v)/F (v) < δ −1 and has to hold for every v > 0 = v i .
Example 1 (Multiplicity). Suppose that F (v) = v 2 with support in [0, 1]. By
Corollary 1, homogeneous games possess a unique symmetric equilibrium, which
√
is given by xs = ( 1 + 4δ 2 − 1)/(2δ) < 1 for any δ. Notice that uniqueness is
not guaranteed, as condition (3) is never satisfied for all v > 0.9 In particular, for
p
δ > 3/4, there are two asymmetric equilibria for i = 1, 2 given by

.
√
xi = 1 + 4δ 2 − 3
2δ


.
√
x3−i = 1 − 4δ 2 − 3
2δ.

8

The implicit function theorem guarantees the local uniqueness of the vector x defined by
H(x) ≡ (H1 (x), H2 (x), . . . , Hn (x)) = 0. Gale and Nikaido (1965) show that, when the Jacobian
of H is a P-matrix, the vector x becomes globally unique. Although the proof provided is
constructive, it can be shown that condition (3) guarantees the Jacobian of H to be a P-matrix.
9
Since f (v)/F (v) = 2/v, for every δ there exists a value of v > 0 such that (3) does not hold.
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Example 2 (Extreme-Value Distribution). Following Seim (2006), assume that
v follows a standard type-I extreme value distribution. Then f (v)/F (v) = e−v ,
which is decreasing in v. Since f (0)/F (0) = 1, condition (3) is satisfied for every
δ < 1, which implies that the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for
this set of parameters.
Example 3 (Normal Distribution). Berry and Tamer (2006) observe that, when
vi ∼ N (µ, σ) and δ > µ, the entry game has multiple equilibria when σ → 0 and
a unique equilibrium when σ → ∞. Let µ = 1 and δ = 4. Using that the reverse
hazard rate for a normal distribution decreases in v, that f (0)/F (0) decreases in σ,
and condition (3), we can establish that the entry game has a unique equilibrium
whenever σ > 3.876.

4.2

Uniqueness in Applications

To illustrate how our sufficient condition applies to commonly-used models in the
literature, consider the following example under linear profit functions. When firm
i is the sole entrant in the market its profits are πi (vi ) = vi − Ki where Ki are the
publicly known entry costs of firm i. If both firms enter, firm i’s profits become
πi (vi , vj ) = (1 − γ)vi − ρvj − δ − Ki . The profit functions are increasing in firm i’s
private signal vi (assumption A1) and are weakly decreasing in j’s entry (δ ≥ 0 and
γ ∈ [0, 1]) and in j’s private information (ρ ≥ 0, as in A2). This parametrization
captures the idea that entry by an opponent decreases firm profitability and that
the magnitude of this loss depends on the traits of the competing firm.
Consider firm i’s profit loss when j enters the market: ∆i,j (vi , vj ) = γvi +ρvj +δ.
Table 2 summarizes different entry models under various assumptions of market
competition.10 Case A corresponds to scenarios in which firms do not interact.
This may happen because firms are not direct market competitors, competitors
are atomistics, or where firm i is the only potential entrant in the industry.
A type-independent extensive margin model (case B) assumes that j’s entry
decreases i’s profit, but this decrease is independent of the characteristics of both
firms. A large extent of the Industrial Organization literature, beginning with the
seminal work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992), has examined these
effects in the context of a complete information model. Seim (2006) and Grieco
(2014) are examples of case B models in the context of private information. The
10

See the Online Appendix for a discussion on the micro-foundation of these cases.
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Table 2: Different dimensions of competition in oligopolistic models
Case
Competition Model
A
No Interaction

∆i,j (vi , vj )
0

B

Type-independent e.m.

δ

C

Type-dependent e.m.

γvi

D

Intensive margin

ρvj

E

Full Oligopoly

γvi + ρvj + δ

Condition (3)
Always unique

CDF
No condition

fi (vi )
1
<
Fi (vi )
δ
vi fi (vi )
1
<
Fi (vi )
γ
vi fi (vi )
<1
Fi (vi )
vi fi (vi )
<1
Fi (vi )

Bounded
hazard rate
Concave∗
Concave∗
Concave∗

Notes: (a) e.m. stands for extensive margin. (b) The parameters of the model in each case are: A)
γ = ρ = δ = 0; B) γ = ρ = 0; δ > 0; C) ρ = δ = 0; γ ∈ (0, 1); D) γ = δ = 0, ρ > 0, and; E) δ, ρ >
0, γ ∈ (0, 1). (c) Conditions D and E make use of πi (vi , vj ) = max{0, (1 − γ) vi − ρvj − δ} − Ki
as a firm may choose not to produce if it leads to negative variable profits. Thus, ∆i,j (vi , vj ) is
always bounded above by vi .
∗
When the support of Fi is R+ , concavity of the CDF is equivalent to vfi (v) < Fi (v) (cases
C–E). When the support of Fi is R, the conditions above are weaker than concavity.

proposed model also accommodates important aspects of competition that have
not yet been fully explored in the literature.11
A type-dependent extensive margin model (case C) incorporates the idea that
j’s entry directly affects i’s profitability by taking away a share γ of the market.
In contrast to the previous models, the profitability of i in its share of the market
and, consequently, the magnitude of i’s profit loss, directly depends on i’s private
information. This scenario may represent competition in differentiated products
where a firm’s private information corresponds to the quality or marginal costs of
its product. Similarly, we could consider models in which the intensive margin
effect (case D) is isolated. In these models, larger draws of vj , which can be
interpreted as facing a more competitive opponent, leads firm i to experience a
larger profit loss when j enters the market.
More generally, our framework can account for competition models that incorporate both intensive and extensive margins effects (case E). It can also accommodate micro-founded models—such as price and quantity competition with general
11

Entry models in which private information is introduced as a linear additive shocks (case B)
include Seim (2006); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007); Bajari et al. (2007); Pakes et al. (2007);
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008); Sweeting (2009); Aradillas-Lopez (2010); Bajari et al.
(2010); De Paula and Tang (2012); Vitorino (2012); Grieco (2014); Mazzeo et al. (2016).
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demand forms—in which these effects can appear in non-linear ways. Finally, the
model is flexible enough to capture heterogeneity among firms, incorporating the
idea that firms may have different size, capacities, technologies, suppliers, locations, etc.
Table 2 also summarizes sufficient condition (3) for the different cases. Due to
the linerarity of the profit function, the sufficient condition translates to imposing
structure to the distribution of private information. In type-independent extensive
margin models (case B), for instance, it is sufficient that the reversed hazard rate
of the distributions to be bounded by the inverse of the increase-in-competition
effect, δ. When the reversed hazard rate fi (vi )/Fi (vi ) is decreasing in vi , as is the
case with Type-I Extreme Value distributions, it is sufficient to check the condition
at the entry lower bound v i . For cases C–E, a weak version of concavity of the
CDF guarantees equilibrium uniqueness.
More generally, in micro-founded models of competition, condition (3) may be
hard to verify. It requires computing closed-form solutions to both monopolistic
and duopolistic outcomes. The next result provides a stronger sufficient condition
that may be easier to check in applied work.12
Corollary 2. Let π̃i (ve ) ≥ 0 be firms’ i variable profits under market structure and
realization of private information ve . The entry game has a unique equilibrium if
for every firm i and all vi > v i :
π̃i0 (vi )
ε≡
π̃i (vi )



fi (vi )
> 1.
Fi (vi )

(4)

The corollary simply follows from observing that πi0 (vi ) = π̃i0 (vi ) and ∆(vi , vj ) =
π̃i (vi ) − π̃i (vi , vj ) ≤ π̃i (vi ) because variable profits are non-negative. The term ε
corresponds to the elasticity of firm i’s monopolistic variable profits with respect
its distribution of private information. Condition (4) tells us that uniqueness
is achieved when monopoly variable profits are responsive to changes in private
information; i.e., when a change in firm i’s expected profit induced by increasing xi
cannot be overcome by a change in best response xj . Condition in (4) is stronger
than (3) in the sense that there may exists models in which (3) is satisfied but
none of the conditions in (4) hold. It is, however, easier to check as only requires
information about each firm’s monopolistic variable profits.
12

See the Online Appendix for examples of micro-founded models and their conditions for
uniqueness.
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4.3

Comparative Statics

We now study comparative statics for the entry model. We begin by parameterizing
the fundamentals of the model (πi , Fi ). Suppose that, for each firm i, there are
parameters (ωi , θi ) characterizing the distribution of private information Fi (vi ) =
Fi (vi |ωi ) and profits πi (ve ) = πi (ve , θi ), respectively. We assume that for every
i, the family (ωi )ni=1 orders Fi (vi |ωi ) in terms of first order stochastic dominance
(FOSD). In particular, we assume ω 0 > ω implies Fi (vi |ω 0 ) ≤ Fi (vi |ω) for every
vi . Similarly, the family of parameters (θi )ni=1 order the firms’ profits uniformly;
i.e., θ0 > θ implies πi (ve , θ0 ) > πi (ve , θ) for every vector and market structure ve .
In words, under higher θ, firm i becomes uniformly more profitable. Examples
of objects that can order firms profits uniformly are entry costs, fixed costs of
production, or access to cheaper suppliers. Finally, using (2), define
Z

∞

H̄i (x) ≡

Hi (s, x−i )dFi (s)

(5)

xi

to be the ex-ante expected profit of firm i when the vector of cutoffs x is played.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium and under condition (3), an increase of ωi or θi
leads to: (i) A decrease in xi and a increase in xj . (ii) An increase in H̄i (x) and
a decrease in H̄j (x).
Proposition 2 is quite intuitive, it tells us that when firm i becomes more
competitive—by having, for example, lower entry costs or systematically higher
draws of private information—firm i is more likely to participate in the market
and receives higher expected profits. In contrast, when an opponent becomes more
competitive, a firm is less likely to enter the market and receives lower expected
profits. Observe that the results in Proposition 2 are only guaranteed when the
conditions for uniqueness in equation (3) hold. This suggests that models possessing multiple equilibria may be associated with ill-behaved comparative statics.
Some empirical studies of entry models under complete information deal with
estimation problems due to multiplicity of equilibria using an equilibrium selection
criteria. A common criteria used in practice is to assume that there exists an entry
order among firms which is based on the firm’s profitability. In particular, it is
assumed that more profitable firms enter the market first (Berry, 1992; Jia, 2008).
Because under incomplete information multiplicity of equilibria may still exist, a
natural question to ask is whether this methodology can be extrapolated to this
19

context. More precisely, we examine whether firms’ ex-ante expected profits—i.e.,
before firms observe their private information—relate to cutoff order and entry
probabilities. Ex-ante expected profits are a good proxy for (ex-post) aggregated
firm profitability, as the latter could be understood as the realization of multiple
entry decisions in independently drawn markets. We show that the relative likelihood of entering a market, cutoff order, and firm profitability are related in the
class models defined below.13
Definition (Quasi-homogeneous in Distributions – QHD). An entry game is quasihomogeneous in distribution when firms are characterized by homogeneous and
anonymous profit functions, a collection of parameters (ωi )ni=1 and CDFs Fi (vi ) =
F (vi |ωi ) such that ωi orders Fi in terms of first order stochastic dominance
Definition (Quasi-homogeneous in Profits – QHP). An entry game is quasihomogeneous in Profits when firms are described by homogeneous CDFs, a collection of parameters (θi )ni=1 , and πi (ve ) = π(ve , θi ) where θi order i’s profits uniformly.
Quasi-homogeneous entry games corresponds to the private information analogue of a wide class of models studied in practice, including the analogue of Berry
(1992) where firms can be ex-ante ranked by entry costs. Other examples of quasihomogeneous games arise in situations where firms are ranked in terms of their
production capacities, or where firms produce homogeneous goods but may have
access to different production technologies. In practice, QHD games have been
used in the empirical auction literature by Athey et al. (2011) where bidders are
ordered in terms of hazard rates; and QHP models have been studied by Vitorino
(2012) where profits are linear in the private information and vi are identically
distributed among firms.
Proposition 3. Firms ex-ante profits (5) can be (inversely) ranked according to
the order of equilibrium cutoffs when: (i) firms are homogeneous and play an asymmetric equilibrium; (ii) firms are quasi-homogeneous (in distributions or profits)
and play herculean equilibria. In these situations, a lower entry cutoff also translates to higher probability of entering the market.
In entry games where firms have identical distributions of private information,
as in homogeneous entry games or in QHP games, entry cutoff ranking naturally
13
The difference between quasi-homogeneous (QH) games and the order presented at the beginning of this section is that QH games order across instead of within a firm.
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translates into a ranking of market-entry probabilities. Despite firms having different CDFs, this relation between cutoff and entry likelihood extends to QHD
games whenever firms play herculean equilibria. In applied work, these connections are important, as they link a firm’s observed behavior (e.g., firm’s probability
of entering a market) with equilibrium behavior and observed profitability.
In more general models of market entry, Proposition 3 does not necessarily
hold. We can construct examples in which cutoff order, entry probability, and
profit-ranking do not relate. To illustrate this, consider again the example in Table
1 corresponding to a type-independent extensive margin model (Table 2 case B).
Consider the following set of assumptions: firms pay an entry cost K = 1/2,
δ1 = 1/4, δ2 = 1/6, v1 ∼ U [0, 1], and v2 ∼ U [0, 4/5]. In this scenario firms are not
(quasi ) homogeneous but are equally strong with si = 4/7 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Firm
1 is more profitable in expectation, because F1 (v) FOSD F2 (v). However, firm 1
suffers more losses when facing competition because δ1 > δ2 . Also, it is not hard
to verify that condition (4) holds for all vi > 1/2 ≡ v i .14 Hence, the game has
a unique equilibrium (the herculean equilibrium). By Corollary 1, firms playing
cutoffs equal to their strength, i.e., x1 = x2 = 4/7, is an herculean equilibrium.
Thus, firms are not (strictly) ordered in terms of their entry cutoffs. Observe that
firm 1 is more likely to enter the market as F1 (4/7) = 4/7 < 5/7 = F2 (4/7).
Firm 1 also obtains higher expected profits as H̄1 (X)/H̄2 (X) = 225/64 > 1. By
continuity, one can construct similar examples with a slightly smaller (larger) δ1
such that x1 < s1 < s2 < x2 (x1 > s1 > s2 > x2 ), while preserving equilibrium
uniqueness and the previous rankings in terms of expected profit and probability
of entering the market.
The example above shows that our framework can accommodate situations
where the ranking of firm profitability (represented by vi ) is different than the ranking of firm competitiveness (represented by δi ). In complete information models,
this degree of firm heterogeneity would violate the assumption of the equilibrium
selection criteria proposed by Berry (1992). To illustrate this, consider a perfect
information version of the example in Table 1. Assume that monopoly profits are
π1M = 0.23 and π2M = 0.2 and, using δ1 = 1/4 and δ2 = 1/6, duopoly profits are
π1D = −0.02 and π2D = 0.033. This is a simple variation on the Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) model where δi is heterogeneous among firms.15 Because complete inSimply observe that fi (vi )/Fi (vi ) = vi−1 , ∆i = δi , and π 0 (vi , ve ) = 1 for all e. Then (4) for
firm i becomes vi > δi which holds for vi >v i =1/2.
15
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) propose an estimator to partially identify the parameters of the
14
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formation models may have multiple equilibria, Berry (1992) proposed a monotone
selection criteria where, at every step, the most profitable firm decides whether to
enter the market. This criteria relies on the assumption that the ranking of firm
profitability does not change across market structures. In the example above, this
is not true. When there are no firms in the market, firm 1 has the largest monopolistic profits and the criteria prescribes entry. In the second step, firm 2 also enters
the market because π2D > 0. This, however, cannot be an equilibrium because
π1D < 0. Moreover, the unique equilibrium of the game is that only firm 2 enters,
even though firm 1 would have higher monopoly profits. Although we assume that
firms possess private information, one of our main contributions is to provide a
framework and a methodology that can handle any type of firm heterogeneity, including situations in which the ranking of firm profitability changes across market
structures.

5

Equilibria with More than Two Entrants

This section extends the ideas behind Proposition 1 in contexts with more than two
potential entrants. The first extension studies an environment with n homogeneous
firms. The second extends results to a scenario in which firms belong to one of two
groups, each group having an arbitrary number of potential entrants. Firms are
identical within groups, but there are no restrictions on the degree heterogeneity in
profit functions and distribution of private information that firms can have across
groups.
The next definition extends firm’s i profit loss after firm j enters the market
under more general market structures. As before, this object will be important in
defining the sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium. For any firm i and
fix a market structure e such that i participates (i.e., e ∈ Ei ), for any firm j not
participating in market e (i.e., j ∈ Oi (e)) define:
∆i,j (vi , vj , ve ) ≡ πi (vi , ve\i ) − πi (vi , vj , ve\i )

(6)

to be firm i’s profit loss when firm j enters the market under initial market structure
e, firm i’s private information is vi , firm j’s private information is vj , and the rest
of the entering firms private information is represented by ve\i . Observe that, by
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) model when δi varies by firm.
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A2, this loss is non-negative for any vi , vj and ve , i.e., ∆i,j (vi , vj , ve ) ≥ 0.

5.1

Homogeneous Entry Games

We begin by extending the ideas behind Proposition 1 to n-firm homogeneous entry
games which were formally defined in Section 3.2. We can drop the i sub-index
from profits and distributions functions, and write i’s profit loss in market structure
e as ∆(vi , vj , ve ), because under homogeneity profits functions are anonymous and
identical across firms.
Proposition 1A. In homogeneous entry games, there exists a unique herculean
equilibrium characterized by the strength of the firms; i.e., xi = s for all i, where
s is the unique number that solves


Z ∞
n−1 
X
n−1
n−1−r
r
σ(s) ≡
F (s)
π(s, yr )φi (yr )d y = 0.
r
s
r=0
Moreover, if for every market structure e ∈ Ei , every opponent j ∈ Oi (e), and
draws of private information vk ≥ v k for k ∈ e ∪ j the following holds
∆(vi , vj , ve ) f (vi )
< 1,
π 0 (vi , ve ) F (vi )

(7)

the herculean (i.e., symmetric) equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game.
From Corollary 1 we know that homogeneous games have a unique symmetric
equilibrium. Proposition 1A, thus, builds upon this result by providing a sufficient
condition under which the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of
the entry game. Comparing conditions (7) and (3) two key differences arise: (i)
condition (7) has to hold across more market structures e (not only monopolyduopoly), and; (ii) it has to hold for every realization of ve . This suggests that
condition (7) is, in principle, more demanding than (3). In practice, however,
this may not be the case. As shown in Proposition 4 in Section 6 below, for
certain models of quantity competition, if condition (4) in Corollary 2 holds for
the monopolist, then condition (7) holds for every possible market structure.
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5.2

Two Groups of Firms

We now extend our model to a market characterized by two groups of firms g ∈
{1, 2}. Within each group firms are identical (homogeneous). Group g consists of
mg ∈ N firms described by the pair (πg , Fg ). Let gi be the group of firm i, define
gi
πi (ve ) ≡ πgi (vi , ve\i
, ve3−gi ) where veg represents the draws of private information of

firms in group g that participate under market structure e. We assume that profits
are anonymous to the private information of competitors within a group: i.e.,
gi
gi
πgi (vi , ve\i
, ve3−gi ) = πgi (vi , vperm
, v 3−gi ) where vpermgi (e) is any permutation
g
(e\i) permg (e)
i

i

that fixes the group g and the realizations in ve but changes the identities of the
entering firms in e excluding the identity of firm i.
Because firms are homogeneous within a group, an herculean equilibrium prescribes that every firm within a group should play symmetric strategies. To forQ
mally characterize an equilibrium, fix a firm i, let ϕgi (ve ) = j∈e\i,gj =g fg (vj ) be
the probability that firms participating under the structure e that belong to group
g but are not firm i, and draw the vector of private information veg . Without loss
of generality, we assume that firms in group 1 are stronger than those in group 2
(s1 ≤ s2 ). For a pair of cutoff strategies x = (x1 , x2 ) define E[πgi (vi )|x, r, k] as the
expected profits of a firm in group gi when it draws private information vi , and r
other firms of group gi and k firms of group 3 − gi have entered the market, that is
Z

∞

Z

∞

E[πgi (vi )|x, r, k] =
x1

x2

gi
i
πgi (vi , ve\i
, ve3−gi )ϕ3−g
(ve )ϕgi i (ve\i )dk ve3−gi
i



gi
dr ve\i

gi
where the integrals are over the r and k dimensions of ve\i
and ve3−gi respectively.

Then, a pair of strategies x = (x1 , x2 ) is an equilibrium if and only if, from the
perspective of a firm in group gi , x satisfies:
( 
"m −1 
#)

mj
i
X
X
mj
mi − 1
mj −k
mi −1−r
Fj (xj )
Fi (xi )
E[πi (xi )|x, r, k]
= 0,
k
r
r=0
k=0
where, for notational ease, i = gi and j = 3 − gi . To understand the equation
above, fix a market structure e in which r firms of group i and k firms of group j
participate in the market. Because there are mj firms in group j, there exist mj
choose k possibilities to obtain a market structure with k competitors from group j,
each occurring with probability Fj (xj )mj −k . Similarly, because the analysis is from
the perspective of a firm in group gi , there exists mi − 1 choose r possibilities to
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observe r competitors from group i, each occurring with probability Fi (xi )mi −1−k .
The expression above is, thus, obtained by summing across every possible market
structure e.
Proposition 1B. An herculean equilibrium always exists. Moreover, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game if for any market structure
e ∈ Ei , any firm j 6∈ e, and any type vk ≥ v k for k ∈ e ∪ j the following conditions
holds:
 If j belongs to i’s group (i.e., gj = gi ):

∆i,j (vi , vj , ve ) fi (vi )
<1
πi0 (vi , ve ) Fi (vi )

(8)

 If j does not belong to i’s group (i.e., gj 6= gi ):

1
∆i,j (vi , vj , ve ) fi (vi )
< 3−gi
0
πi (vi , ve ) Fi (vi )
mO(e)

(9)

i
where m3−g
O(e) is the number of firms in group 3 − gi that do not participate in

market structure e.
Proposition 1B provides two conditions that need to be satisfied for uniqueness.
Condition (8) is analogous to (7) in Proposition 1A, as it is required to hold
among firms within the same group; i.e., among homogeneous firms. This condition
guarantees that only group-symmetric strategies are played. Empirical applications
usually restrict their analyzes to these type of strategies (see references below).
Condition (8), thus, guarantees that this restriction is without loss. Recall that
herculean equilibria are always group-symmetric equilibria. Firms belonging to the
same group are equally strong and, therefore, play the same (herculean) strategy.
Condition (9), on the other hand, guarantees that the herculean equilibrium is
the unique equilibrium of the game. Condition (9) has to hold for every firm that is
not in the same group than firm i and is a bit more demanding than condition (8),
as its right hand side (RHS) is a function of the number of firms not participating
in market structure e. In other words, the larger the number of firms in group
3 − gi participating in e, the more likely is that condition (9) holds. Notice that
3−gi
(9) has to hold for any j ∈ O(e), thus, the smallest value for mO(e)
is 1.

In applied work, models of two groups of potential entrants have been used by
Athey et al. (2011) and Roberts and Sweeting (2013), who study the timberwood
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industry, and distinguish between loggers and mills; and by Krasnokutskaya and
Seim (2011), who study highway procurement, and divide firms between favored
(small) and non-favored (large) firms. This type of group structure can arise in
applications ranging from incumbents and entrants, high and low quality segments,
local and international producers, discount retailers and traditional supermarkets,
to legacy and low-cost airlines.

6

Discussion

In this section we discuss some results in greater depth, present some extensions,
and relate our results to other topics outside the entry literature.
Uniqueness and Market Demand The sufficient condition for uniqueness (4)
can be related to observable market objects. We can do this by interpreting private
information as marginal cost. In particular, assume there exists a marginal cost
function ci (vi ) that is decreasing and differentiable in vi . Let p∗i (ve ) be firm’s i
equilibrium price under market structure and realization of private information ve .
Then, µi (ve ) ≡ (p∗i (ve )−ci (vi ))/ci (vi ) represents i’s markup under market structure
and private information ve .
Lemma 4. In games in which higher vi leads to lower marginal costs ci (vi ), condition (4) is equivalent to
−c0i (vi )
ci (vi )



fi (vi )
> µi (vi ).
Fi (vi )

(10)

This function identifies a unique equilibrium for entry games in which the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to the distribution of private information is
larger than the mark-up. The mark-up connects uniqueness to demand elasticity.
For example, markets with inelastic demand tend to have lower mark-ups, suggesting that those markets have a unique entry equilibrium. Similarly, if firms have a
very elastic marginal cost function with respect to the private information vi , the
game is likely to have a unique equilibrium.
A Single Sufficient Condition The number of sufficient conditions to check
increase exponentially in the number of potential entrants n. This is the case because, for each firm i, we have to check whether conditions hold for each feasible
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market structure. The next proposition shows that, in quantity competition models, it is sufficient to check a single condition per firm. In particular, we show that
when uniqueness condition (4) (or (10)) holds under monopoly, the conditions in
markets with more competitors also hold.
Proposition 4. In quantity competition games in which higher vi leads to lower
marginal costs ci (vi ) and where entry decreases markups, µ(ve ). If condition (4)
(or equivalently condition (10)) holds for firm i at vi , then condition (7) holds at
ve = (vi , ve\i ) for any realization of ve\i and market structure e ∈ Ei .
Consider a Cournot competition game with homogeneous goods and linear deP
mand P = 1 − Q where Q = i∈n qi and ci (vi ) : R → [0, 1) (see Online Appendix).
As in Corollary 2, we can substitute ∆i,j (x, y, ve ) for π̃i (x, ve ) in condition (7) and
get a stronger sufficient condition. Then, it is not hard to verify
(1 − ci (vi ))
π̃i (vi )
π̃i (ve )
1
−
= 0
≥ 0
=− 0
0
2ci (vi )
π̃i (vi )
π̃i (ve )
2ci (vi )

1+

P

j∈e\i cj (vj )

ne

!
− ci (vi )

where c0i (vi ) < 0 for all vi . This inequality implies that checking for (4) (competition under monopoly) at the realization vi is sufficient for (7) to hold at any
ve = (vi , ve\i ); i.e., (7) holds for any market structure e, independently of the
realization of competitors’ private information ve\i .
Selective Entry Recent structural analyses of market entry study scenarios in
which firms are ex-ante homogeneous but become partially informed before their
entry decision by receiving a signal correlated with their type. Since firms with
high realizations are relatively more likely to enter the market, there is selective
entry.16 At one extreme there are LS models (Levin and Smith, 1994) where signals
are infinitely noisy; i.e., firms possess no private information before entry. At the
other extreme are S models (Samuelson, 1985) in which firms become perfectly (and
privately) informed about their type. The model presented in Section 2 belongs to
the latter category. Below, we argue that both models with perfectly informative
signals and models with a partially informative signals can be solved using the tools
developed in this article. Notice, however, that these models may have different
empirical predictions (Gentry and Li, 2014). For example, in a selective entry
16

Selective entry models have been studied by Roberts and Sweeting (2013); Gentry and Li
(2014); Bhattacharya et al. (2014); Sweeting and Bhattacharya (2015); Grieco (2014).
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model with a partially informative signal, an entrant who receives a high signal
will submit a “very low” bid after learning that his true value is low.17 This cannot
happen in games with perfectly informative signals.
LS models, as argued by Roberts and Sweeting (2013, 2016) and Gentry and
Li (2014), produce no selection in unobservables. These models can predict the
number, but not the identity, of entrants from a particular group. The models also
predict that there are no differences in unobservable (to other players) characteristics between entrants and non-entrants. These are the same predictions of models
à la Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). Because entry in LS models occurs before private
information is revealed, these types of entry games are de facto games of complete
information. Li and Zheng (2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), modify
the LS model by allowing entry costs to be private information before entry occurs,
but realization of valuations to be learned after entry. This condition turns the
entry stage into a private information game, which is embedded in our framework.
However, because entry costs do not affect valuations, there is no selective entry:
the distribution of valuations before and after firms’ entry decisions coincide.
We now show that under a simple informational assumption and a reinterpretation of the profit function, our results extend to general selective entry models.
Let Fi (vi , εi ) be a joint cumulative distribution of signals vi and types ε with support in R2 . The distributions Fi are independent across firms. Before making their
entry decisions, firms observe the signal vi that partially informs firms about their
R∞
type εi . Let Fi (vi ) = −∞ Fi (vi , s)ds and let Fi (εi |vi ) = Fi (vi , εi )/Fi (vi ) be the
CDF of εi conditional on vi .
(A4) Affiliated Signals: For v 0 > v, Fi (ε|v 0 ) < Fi (ε|v) for all i and ε.
Assumption A4 states that higher signals lead to higher expected types in terms of
First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) similarly to Marmer et al. (2013) and
Gentry and Li (2014).
Let π̂i (εe ) be the profits of firm i when the market structure is e and the
realization of private information for every firm in e is εe . Then, we can re-interpret
πi (ve ) as
Z

∞

πi (ve ) =

Y

π̂i (εe )
−∞

fk (εk |vk )dne εe

k∈I(e)

where the integral is across the ne dimensions of εe . Given the properties of FOSD,
17
Where a “very low” bid is in relation to the entry cost, the number of potential entrants and
their distributions of private characteristics.
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it is straightforward to see that if the profit function π̂i (εe ) satisfies analogous
conditions to A1-A3, then πi (ve ) satisfies the assumptions of the model, and the
results go through.
Observe that πi (ve ) is obtained by integrating π̂i (εe ) over all possible realizations of εe . This means that we could weaken the differentiability requirements of
π̂i and the everywhere (strictly) increasing assumption in εi , and still obtain A1
in πi . This means that our results apply to selective entry models in which firms
compete on prices with homogeneous goods and in second-price auctions. This
case is studied further in Espı́n-Sánchez et al. (2018).
Dynamic Oligopoly Models with Entry We present our results in the context
of static entry games. Our findings, however, extend to dynamic entry models á
la Ericson and Pakes (1995) when firms possess private information when deciding
whether to enter (e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007). In a dynamic setting, it
is sufficient to show that the entry value function (the sum of current profits and
the discounted expected sum of future profits) satisfies assumptions A1-A3, when
firms make their entry decisions. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to
find conditions in the game fundamentals that guarantee that the value function
satisfies these assumptions, we think it is an important avenue for future work.
Supermodular Games There are some similarities in our approach to the theory of supermodular games. Although, supermodularity requires players’ actions to
be strategic complements (see Morris and Shin, 2003), and while we treat actions by
contrast as strategic substitutes, our uniqueness condition imposes a payoff structure that resembles supermodularity. To illustrate this, consider an entry game
with two potential firms. The uniqueness condition requires that firm i’s profits
from participating in the market are increasing in its private information, even
when firm j best-responds to i’s entry. That is, once we account for the opponent’s
actions, higher draws of private information always leads to higher incentives to
enter.

7

Concluding Remarks

In this article, we study entry games under private information. Our analysis
generalizes previous models by allowing heterogeneous firms and rich strategic
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interactions. The proposed model provides a framework that can be used in empirical work to incorporate firm selection. To characterize the game, we propose
a simple firm index, called strength, that orders firms by competitiveness. This
index greatly reduces the computational burden of calculating equilibria with heterogeneous firms. The equilibrium associated with this index (herculean) can be
thought of as a focal equilibrium in games with heterogeneous firms. This equilibrium always exists and is unique under mild conditions that are easy to check.
The model presented here is general, encompassing entry models currently used
in both the theoretical and the empirical literature. The tools we develop could
also be useful in solving more general (non-entry) games. Although the research is
beyond the scope of this article, the results could be extended to dynamic games
with finite or infinite horizons. In that case, one would have to check that the
value function in the Bellman equation is monotone on the firm’s type, and that
the other regularity conditions hold. We believe that this avenue of research has
great potential.
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Appendix
A

Omitted Proofs

Proof of Proposition 0. Best responses are cutoff strategies: Fix any firm i and
vector of strategies τ . Because i’s profit is linear in τi , i’s best response is to participate
with probability one whenever there is a positive payoff of doing so. Suppose i enters
the market with certainty (τi (vi ) = 1). A1 implies that profits are strictly increasing
in vi . By A3 Πi (v i , τ ) ≤ 0, and Πi (v̄i , τ ) > 0. Thus, Πi (vi , τ ) single crosses zero
and i’s best response to τ−i is the cutoff strategy defined by the value xi that satisfies
Πi (xi , τi = 1, τ−i ) = 0.
Existence: We check the conditions of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. Because Fi is
atomless and has full support and πi (ve ) being continuous and differentiable in vi , player
i’s best response lies in the compact and convex set [v i , v̄i ]. Thus the n-dimensional
function of best responses is a continuous mapping from ×ni=1 [v i , v̄i ] to itself and the
conditions for the theorem are met.

Proof of Lemma 1. By the previous proof a cutoff strategy is defined as the value xi
satisfying Πi (xi , τi = 1, τ−i ) = 0. Because in a cutoff equilibrium Pr[e|τ, vi ] is either zero
or one. Integrating (1) over payoff-irrelevant firms delivers (2).

Proof of Lemma 2. Start with the derivative of Hi with respect to i, then:



Z ∞


X
Y
∂Hi

=
Fj (xj )
πi0 (xi , ve ) φi (ve )dne −1 ve\i > 0.


∂xi
{xj }j∈I (e)
e∈Ei

j∈Oi (e)

(11)

i

For the derivative of Hi with respect to j, pick a market structure e such that j 6∈ e.
Conditional on e, the derivative of Hi with respect to xj is equal to:


Z ∞
Y
fj (xj ) 
Fk (xk )
πi (xi , ve ) φi (ve )dne −1 ve\i > 0.
k∈Oi (e)\j

{xk }k∈Ii (e)

Now take market structure e from above and, using Leibnitz differentiation, compute
the derivative of Hi with respect to xj conditional on market structure e ∪ j; i.e., entry
decisions by every firm remain the same as in e except that of firm j, which now enters:


Z ∞
Y
−fj (xj ) 
Fk (xk )
πi (xi , xj , ve ) φi (ve )dne −1 ve\i < 0.
k∈Oi (e)\j

{xk }k∈Ii (e)

Observe that both expressions from above only differ in sign and in the profit function
that is integrated over. Summing both equations delivers a positive expression where
the integral is over ∆i,j (xi , xj , ve ) which is the non-negative expression defined in (6).
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Summing across every market structure we obtain:



Z ∞


X
Y
∂Hi

= fj (xj )
Fk (xk )
∆i,j (xi , xj , ve ) φi (ve )dne −1 ve\i .


∂xj
(xk )k∈I (e)
e∈Ei \Ej

k∈Oi (e)\j

(12)

i

Thus, the derivative is non-negative.



Proof of Lemma 3. We show that si exists and that σi (s) single crosses zero.
Existence: Observe that A3 jointly with A2 imply σi (v i ) < 0. We need to show that
exist ŝ such that σi (ŝ) > 0, so that σi (si ) = 0 exist by the Intermediate Value Theorem.
Observe that, by Lemma 2, σi (s) ≥ Hi (xi = s, −∞−i ).18 But, by A3, there exist ŝ such
that Hi (xi = ŝ, −∞−i ) > 0. Thus, for the same ŝ, we have that σi (ŝ) > 0.
Uniqueness: By Lemma 2 and the chain rule we have that σi0 (s) > 0. Thus, σi (s) single
crosses zero; i.e., there is a unique value si satisfying σi (si ) = 0.

Proof of Corollary 1.
By definition of strength, if σi (s) = 0 for every i, then
Hi (s, . . . , s) = 0 for every i and xi = s for all i constitute an equilibrium. The equilibrium
is the unique herculean equilibrium as, by Lemma 3, strength is uniquely defined.

Proof of Proposition 1. Preliminaries: Suppose first s1 = s2 = s. Then, by definition
of strength, x1 = x2 = s corresponds to a herculean equilibrium. Assume without loss
of generality s1 < s2 . Define g(x) to be the function that solves H1 (g(x), x) = 0. Then,
g(x) corresponds to firm one’s best response to firm two, when firm two plays the cutoff
strategy x. By Lemma 7 in Appendix B, the value g(x) exists and is unique; i.e., g(x) is
well defined.
Claim 1. g(s1 ) = s1 , g 0 (x) ≤ 0 and, under (3), g 0 (x) is bounded below by
−

f2 (x)F1 (g(x))
.
F2 (x)f1 (g(x))

(13)

Proof. By definition of strength H1 (s1 , s1 ) = 0. Then, when x = s1 , g(s1 ) = s1 . Using
the implicit function theorem:
g 0 (x) = −

f2 (x)∆1 (g(x), x)
R∞
0
F2 (x)π1 (g(x)) + v π10 (g(x), y)dF2 (y)

which is non-positive as the denominator is positive and the numerator is non-negative.
For the lower bound of g 0 (x) observe that the integral term in the denominator is positive.
Then, taking the integral to zero:
g 0 (x) ≥ −

f2 (x)F1 (g(x))
f2 (x)∆1 (g(x), x)
≥−
,
F2 (x)π10 (g(x))
F2 (x)f1 (g(x))

where condition (3), ∆1 (g(x), x) ≤ F1 (g(x))π10 (g(x))/f1 (g(x)), was used in the second
inequality.

18

The notation xi = −∞ is used to denote that firm i always enters the market; i.e., plays the
entry cutoff −∞. Thus, −∞−i denotes when every firm but i always enter the market.
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Existence: Define the function h : [s1 , ∞) → R by h(x) = H2 (x, g(x)). This function
is continuous and corresponds to the expected profits of firm two entering in the market
when firm 1 best responds to x. Define x2 to be the value satisfying h(x2 ) = 0, we
prove that x2 exists and that is an herculean equilibrium. The next two claims prove
the result.
Claim 2. x2 ∈ (s1 , ∞) is necessary and sufficient for x1 < x2 (herculean cutoffs).
Proof. g(x) is weakly decreasing in x and g(s1 ) = s1 . Therefore, x1 = g(x2 ) < x2 if and
only if x2 ∈ (s1 , ∞).

Claim 3. h(s1 ) < 0 and there exists x̂ such that h(x̂) > 0.
Proof. Because firm two is weak, Lemma 3 and the definition of strength implies h(s1 ) =
H2 (s1 , s1 ) < H2 (s2 , s2 ) = 0. For the second part of the claim start by observing that
H2 (x, y) is increasing in y by Lemma 2. Then H2 (x, g(x)) ≥ H2 (x, −∞) for all x. By
A3, there exists x̂ such that H2 (x̂, −∞) > 0 and the result follows.

Claim 3 and the Intermediate Value Theorem imply that exists x2 > s1 such that
h(x2 ) = 0. Claim 2 implies that (g(x2 ), x2 ) constitute an herculean equilibrium.
Uniqueness: The uniqueness proof is divided in two claims. Condition (3) is used in
each of them.
Claim 4. There exists a unique herculean equilibrium.
Proof. To prove uniqueness within the herculean class, it is shown that h0 (x) > 0 so that
h(x) single crosses zero from below. The derivative of h(x) is:
Z ∞
0
0
h (x) = π2 (x)F1 (g(x)) +
π20 (x, y) dFj (y) + g 0 (x)f1 (g(x)) ∆2 (x, g(x)).
g(x)

The first two terms of h0 (x) are positive. The term containing g 0 (x) is non-positive.
Replacing the lower bound (13), which only needs to hold (by construction of a best
response) for values of g(x) and x greater than v 1 and v 2 respectively, for g(x) we find
Z ∞
f2 (x)∆2 (x, g(x))F1 (g(x))
0
0
h (x) > π2 (x)F1 (g(x)) +
π20 (x, y)dF1 (y) −
F2 (x)
g(x)
Condition (3) implies f2 (x)∆2 (x, g(x)) < F2 (x)π20 (x), then:
Z ∞
h0 (x) >
π20 (x, y)dF1 (y) > 0
g(x)

proving uniqueness within the herculean class.



Claim 5. There is no equilibrium in which the strong firm plays a higher cutoff than
the weak firm.
Proof. To prove that the only equilibrium is the herculean, suppose we have a nonherculean equilibrium—i.e., x1 > x2 but s1 < s2 . Define ḡ(x) to be the function that
satisfies H2 (ḡ(x), x) = 0. ḡ(x) corresponds to firm two’s best response to the cutoff of
firm one when x1 = x. As before, Lemma 7 implies that ḡ(x) is well defined. Similarly,
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following the steps of Claim 1 , it can be shown: ḡ(s2 ) = s2 , ḡ 0 (x) < 0, and, under (3),
ḡ 0 (x) is bounded below by
f1 (x)F2 (g(x))
−
.
(14)
F1 (x)f2 (g(x))
Define the continuous function h̄(x) = H1 (x, ḡ(x)) which corresponds to firm one’s
expected profits of entering in the market under valuation x when firm two best responds
to x. We show that there is no x such that x1 = x > ḡ(x) = x2 and h̄(x) = 0 exists;
i.e., no non-herculean equilibrium exists. Start by observing that x > ḡ(x) if and only if
x ∈ (s2 , ∞). In Lemma 3 we showed the function σ1 (s) = H1 (s, s) is strictly increasing
in s. Then, by the definition of strength and by firm two being weak,
σ1 (s1 ) = H1 (s1 , s1 ) = 0 < σ1 (s2 ) = H1 (s2 , s2 ) = H1 (s2 , ḡ(s2 )) = h̄(s2 ).
Following analogous steps to those in Claim 4 (which requires to use the lower bound
(14)) it is possible to show h̄0 (x) > 0. Then, because h̄(s2 ) > 0 and h̄0 (x) > 0, h̄(x) never
crosses zero when x > s2 and the result holds.


Proof of Proposition 2. We start proving statement (i). Define H : R2+ → R2 where
each dimension is defined according to Hi (xi , xj ). An equilibrium is, thus, defined by
H(x) = 0. We make use of implicit differentiation. Let J be the Jaccovian of H. By
Lemma 2, the terms in the diagonal of J are positive and the off-diagonal terms are
non-negative. Then,




∂H1 ∂H2 ∂H1 ∂H2
+ ≤0
−1
where det(J) =
J = det(J)
−
,
≤0 +
∂x1 ∂x2
∂x2 ∂x1
J−1 consists of positive terms along the diagonal and non-positive terms off the diagonal.
The derivatives in the determinant are computed in Lemma 2. Using condition (3) we
can bound det(J) below and show it is strictly positive.
The comparative static with respect parameter κ ∈ {ωi , θi } is defined by xκ =
−(J−1 )Hκ , where subscripts denote derivatives. The next lemma will be used in this
proof and in the proof of other propositions.
Lemma 5. Let (Fi , πi )ni=1 be (respectively) parametrized by (ωi , θi )ni=1 where ωi orders Fi
in terms of FOSD and where πi is uniformly increasing in θi . Let Hi (x) be the function
defined in (2). Then, for every i and j 6= i
(i)

∂Hi
> 0;
∂θi

(ii)

∂Hi
∂Hi
=
= 0, and;
∂θj
∂ωi

(iii)

∂Hi
< 0.
∂ωj

(15)

Proof. Statement (ii) directly follows from θj and ωi not being in Hi . (i) Follows from πi
being increasing in θi . (iii) follows from observing that when j 6∈ e, Fj (xj |ωj ) decreases
in ωj . When j ∈ e, then
Z ∞
πi (xi , ve ) φi (ve\j )fj (s|ωj )dne −1 ve\i
(xk )k∈Ii (e)

decreases in ωj by integrating over a decreasing function under FOSD.
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To complete proof of the first statement, by the lemma above, the signs of the
derivatives with respect the parameters are Hω1 = [0, −], and Hθ1 = [+, 0] (similarly for
derivatives with respect parameters of firm two), the result follows from multiplying and
checking the sign. For statement (ii) simply note:

Z ∞
∂Hi (s, xj )
dxj
dH̄i
=
+ fj (xj )
∆i (s, xj ) dFi (s) > 0
dθi
∂θi
dθi
xi
Z ∞
dxj
dH̄i
=
fj (xj )
∆i (s, xj )dFi (s) < 0
dθj
dθj
xi
Z ∞
Z ∞
dxj
dH̄i
dfi (s)
=
fj (xj )
∆i (s, xj )dFi (s) +
Hi (s, xj )
ds > 0
dωi
dωi
dωi
xi
xi

Z ∞
∂Hi (s, xj )
dxj
dH̄i
=
+ fj (xj )
∆i (s, xj ) dFi (s) < 0
dωj
∂ωj
dωj
xi
where the signs follow from statement (i), Lemma 5 and by integrating over an increasing
function under FOSD.

Proof of Proposition 3. For claim (i) suppose without loss x1 < x2 . Subtracting
H̄2 (x) to H̄1 (x), see (5), under the assumption that firms are homogeneous we obtain:

Z x2 
Z ∞
H1 (x, x2 ) +
∆(y, x)dF (y) dF (x).
x1

x2

In equilibrium H1 (x1 , x2 ) = 0 and, by Lemma 2, H1 (x, x2 ) > 0 for x > x1 . Also,
∆1 (x, y) ≥ 0. Thus, x1 < x2 implies H̄1 (x) > H̄2 (x). For claim (ii), suppose that firms
are ordered by θi with θ1 > θ2 (similar proof applies when firms are ordered by ωi ). Let
x1 < x2 be a herculean equilibria. Consider an alternative entry game, where firms are
homogeneous and equal to firm 1 (i.e., θi = θ1 ) but x1 < x2 is played. Although this is
not an equilibrium, the same steps as in claim (i) imply H̄1 (x, θ1 ) > H̄2 (x, θ1 ). Then,
because of the profit order, H̄2 (x, θ2 ) < H̄2 (x, θ1 ) and the result follows.

Proof of Proposition 1A. This proof makes use of Lemma 6, presented below.
Lemma 6. Under condition (7), two homogeneous firms that best respond to each other
must play the same cutoff strategy.
Proof. Consider two homogeneous firms, p and q, and fix any profile of cutoffs strategies
(xj )j6=p,q for the rest of the firms. For ease in notation we drop sub-indexes from π and
F when referring to firms p and q. Define Hp,q (x, y) ≡ Hp (xp = x, xq = y, x−{p,q} ) where
Hp is the function defined in (2). Hp,q (x, y) represents p’s expected profit of entering
the market under valuation x when q plays the entry cutoff y and all other firms play
according to (xj )j6=p,q . By Lemma 1, the equilibrium condition for firm p holds whenever
there exists xp and xq such that Hp,q (xp , xq ) = 0. Define g(x) to be the value of xp such
that Hp,q (g(x), x) = 0; i.e., g(x) is p’s best response to xq = x. By Lemma 7, g(x) is
well defined; i.e., there is a unique value g(x) for each x. To prove the Lemma we need
to prove three claims.
Claim 6. There exists a unique equilibrium such that xp = xq .
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Proof. Start by assuming that homogeneous firms play symmetric cutoffs; i.e., xp = xq =
y. Define σ̂p (y) = Hp,q (y, y) and observe that σ̂p (y) = σ̂q (y). By the discussion above, a
p,q-symmetric equilibrium exists whenever σ̂p (y) = 0. We need to show that there exists
a unique value of y such that σ̂p (y) = 0. Following analogous steps to those in Lemma
3, it easy to show σ̂p (v p ) < 0 and that there exists ŷ such that σ̂p (ŷ) > 0. Using Lemma
2, we can show that σ̂p0 (y) > 0 so that the value of y is unique.

Claim 7. Under condition (7): 0 ≥ g 0 (x) > −f (x)F (g(x))/(F (x)f (g(x))).
Proof. To simplify notation we use xq to denote x and xp to denote g(x). Implicitly
differentiating Hp,q (xp , xq ) = 0 and using equations (11) and (12) from Lemma 2, we
obtain that g 0 (x) is equal to:
nQ
R
o
P
∞
ne −1 v
f (xq ) e∈Ep \Eq
e\p
j∈Op (e) Fj (xj )
(xj )j∈Ip (e) ∆p,q (xp , xq , ve )φp (ve )d
nQ
R
o
−
,
P
∞
0 (x , v )φ (v )dne −1 v
F (xq ) e∈Ep
F
(x
)
π
p e p e
e\p
j∈Op (e) j j
(xj )
j∈Ip (e)

which is non-positive as the denominator is positive and numerator is non-negative. To
show the lower bound for g 0 (x) first, make the denominator smaller by taking π 0 (xp , ve ) =
0 for every e ∈ Ep ∩ Eq . After this step, both numerator and denominator are sums of
market structures in Ep \ Eq . Then, use condition (7) to substitute for ∆p,q (xp , xq , ve )
in the numerator and obtain the mentioned lower bound.

Claim 8. An increase in xq , which p best responds by playing g(xq ), leads firm q to
strictly increase its profits; i.e., Hq,p (x, g(x)) is increasing in x.
Proof. Differentiating Hq,p (x, g(x)) with respect to x we obtain

#
"
Z ∞

X  X
f (g(x)) 0
g (x) Pr[Oq (e)]
∆q,p (x, g(x), ve )φq (ve )dne −1 ve\q


F (g(x))
(xj )j∈Ip (e)
e∈Eq \Ep
j∈Oq (e)


Z ∞
X
Y

+
Fj (xj )
π 0 (x, ve )φq (ve )dne −1 ve\q .
e∈Eq

(xj )j∈Ip (e)

j∈Oq (e)

Q
where Pr[Oq (e)] = j∈Oq (e) Fj (xj ). Because g 0 (x) ≤ 0, the first summation is nonpositive. The second summation is positive. Take a lower bound for the first summation
using Claim 7 and condition (7) to get





Z ∞

X  X
Y
F (x)
 f (x) 
Fj (xj )
π 0 (x, ve )
φq (ve )dne −1 ve\q 


F (x)
f (x)
(xj )j∈I (e)
e∈Eq \Ep

j∈Oq (e)

j∈Oq (e)

p

Subtracting to the second summation above we obtain


Z ∞
X
Y


Hq,p (x, g(x)) ≥
Fj (xj )
π 0 (x, ve )φq (ve )dne −1 ve\q > 0
e∈Eq ∩Ep

(xj )j∈Ip (e)

j∈Oq (e)

Proving the result.
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We prove the lemma by contradiction. Recall that (xj )j6=p,q is fixed. Suppose there
exists xp < xq constituting an equilibrium. By Claim 6 there exists a unique value y
such that σ̂j (y) = 0 with j ∈ {p, q}. Suppose first xp < y < xq . Because
σ̂q (y) = Hq,p (y, y) = Hq,p (y, g(y)) = 0,
Claim 8 implies that we must have Hq,p (xq , g(xq )) > 0 as xq > y, which contradicts
(xq , xp ) being an equilibrium. Suppose now xp < xq < y. Lemma 2 and Claim 6 imply:
0 = σ̂p (y) > σ̂p (xq ) = Hp,q (xq , xq ) > Hp,q (xp , xq )
which contradicts (xq , xp ) being an equilibrium. Similar argument can be constructed
for the case y < xp < xq , proving the Lemma.

To prove the proposition observe: (i) By Lemma 3, there exists a unique value of
strength and, therefore, a unique symmetric equilibrium, which also corresponds to the
unique herculean equilibrium. (ii) If firms are not playing a symmetric equilibrium,
then there must exists two homogeneous firms best-responding to each other but playing
different cutoffs, contradicting Lemma 6.

Proof of Proposition 1B. Preliminaries: If s1 = s2 the herculean equilibrium corresponds to the strength of the firms. Assume s1 < s2 and define Hi (xi , xj ) to be equal
to:
"m −1 
#)


mj (
i
X
X
mj
mi − 1
mj −k
mi −1−r
Fj (xj )
Fi (xi )
E[πi (xi )|x, r, k]
.
(16)
k
r
k=0

r=0

The function Hi (xi , xj ) represents the expected profits of entering the market for a firm
in group i when the firm draws xi and the other firms in group i play the cutoff xi
and the firms in group j play the cutoff xj . Define g(x) to be the function that solves
H1 (g(x), x) = 0. Thus, g(x) corresponds to group one’s best response to every firm
in group two playing the cutoff strategy x. By Lemma 7, the value g(x) exists and is
unique; i.e., g(x) is well defined.
Claim 9. g(s1 ) = s1 , g 0 (x) ≤ 0 and, under (9), g 0 (x) is bounded below by (13).
Proof. By definition of strength we know H1 (s1 , s1 ) = 0, therefore g(s1 ) = s1 . Using the
implicit function theorem
g 0 (x) = −

∂H1 (g(x), x)/∂x2
,
∂H1 (g(x), x)/∂x1

which is negative by Lemma 8 in Appendix B. Define
Ei [E[πi (xi )|x, r, k]] =

m
i −1 
X
r=0


mi − 1
Fi (xi )mi −1−r E[πi (xi )|x, r, k].
r

For the lower bound of g(x) observe that the ∆1,1 terms in the denominator of g 0 (x) are
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non-negative. Taking a lower bound by making them zero delivers
Pm2 −1  m2 
f2 (x) k=0
(m2 − k)F2 (x)m2 −k−1 E1 [E[∆1,2 (g(x), x)|x, r, k]]
0
Pm2 k  m2 
g (x) ≥ −
m2 −k E [E[π 0 (g(x))|x, r, k]]
1
1
k=0
k F2 (x)


Pm2
m2
m
−k
2
(m2 − k)F2 (x)
E1 [E[∆1,2 (g(x), x)|x, r, k]]
−f2 (x) k=0
Pmk2  m2 
=
,
m
−k
2
E1 [E[π10 (g(x))|x, r, k]]
F2 (x) k=0
k F2 (x)
where in the last expression we multiplied and divided by F2 (x). Using equation (18)
(see Lemma 9 in Appendix B) in the denominator, we obtain the lower bound (13). 
Existence: Define the function h : [s1 , ∞) → R by h(x) = H2 (x, g(x)). This function
is continuous and corresponds to the expected profits of entering the market for a firm
in group 2 when it draws the valuation x, every other firm in group two plays the cutoff
x, and every firm in group one play their best response to x; i.e., g(x). Define x2 to be
the value satisfying h(x2 ) = 0. Because the statements and the proofs of Claims 2 and
3 apply directly (see the proof of Proposition 1), it follows that there exist x2 > s1 such
that h(x2 ) = 0. Therefore, the pair (g(x2 ), x2 ) constitute a herculean equilibrium of the
game.
Uniqueness. Start by observing that if condition (8) and (9) hold, then condition
(7) holds when applied to firms in the same group. By the Lemma 6, when condition
(7) holds, homogeneous firms will always play (in equilibrium) the same entry cutoff.
Therefore, is without loss to restrict the analysis to within-group symmetric strategies.
To prove uniqueness, then, we need to show that no other herculean equilibrium exists
and that we can not have an equilibrium where x2 < x1 .
Claim 10. There exists a unique herculean equilibrium.
Proof. To prove uniqueness within the herculean class, we shown h0 (x) > 0 so that h(x)
single crosses zero from below. Differentiating h(x) we obtain:
( 
m1
X


m1
F1 (g(x))m1 −1 E2 E[π 0 (x)|x, r, k] +
k
k=0
!)

m
2 −2 
X
m2 − 1
(m2 − r − 1)F2 (x)m2 −2−r E[∆2,2 (xi , xi )|x, r, k]
+
r
r=0


m
1 −1 
X
m1
f1 (g(x))g 0 (x)
(m1 − k)F1 (g(x))m1 −k−1 E2 [E[∆2,1 (x, g(x))|x, r, k]]
k
k=0

The first two terms of h0 (x) are positive, and only the third term (containing g 0 (x)) is
negative. We work on bounding below the third term. Using the lower bound (13) for
g(x) and equation (18) in Lemma 9 we obtain the following lower bound for the third
term:


m
1 −1 
X


m1
m1 −k
0
−
F1 (g(x))
E2 E[π2 (x)|x, r, k]
k
k=0
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Substituting back in the expression for h0 (x) we obtain:
m1

 X
h0 (x) ≥ E2 E[π 0 (x)|x, r, m1 ] +
k=0

 
m1
F1 (g(x))m1 −1 ×
k

m
2 −2 
X
r=0

!)

m2 − 1
(m2 − r − 1)F2 (x)m2 −2−r E[∆2,2 (xi , xi )|x, r, k]
>0
r

which is positive, proving uniqueness within the herculean class.



Claim 11. There is no equilibrium in which the strong firm plays a higher cutoff than
the weak firm.
Proof. To prove that the only equilibrium is the herculean, suppose we have a nonherculean equilibrium—i.e., x1 > x2 but s1 < s2 . Define ḡ(x) to be the function that
satisfies H2 (ḡ(x), x) = 0 were H2 is defined by (16). ḡ(x) corresponds to group two’s best
response to the cutoff of group one when x1 = x. As before, Lemma 7 implies that ḡ(x)
is well defined. Similarly, following the steps of Claim 9, it can be shown: ḡ(s2 ) = s2 ,
ḡ 0 (x) < 0, and, under (9), ḡ 0 (x) is bounded below by
−

f1 (x)F2 (g(x))
.
F1 (x)f2 (g(x))

(17)

Define the continuous function h̄(x) = H1 (x, ḡ(x)) which corresponds to firm one’s
expected profits of entering in the market under valuation x when firm two best responds
to x. We show that there is no x such that x1 = x > ḡ(x) = x2 and h̄(x) = 0 exists;
i.e., no non-herculean equilibrium exists. Start by observing that x > ḡ(x) if and only if
x ∈ (s2 , ∞). In Lemma 3 we showed the function σ1 (s) = H1 (s, s) is strictly increasing
in s. Then, by the definition of strength and by firm two being weak (s1 < s2 ),
σ1 (s1 ) = H1 (s1 , s1 ) = 0 < σ1 (s2 ) = H1 (s2 , s2 ) = H1 (s2 , ḡ(s2 )) = h̄(s2 ).
Following analogous steps to those in Claim 10 (which requires to use the lower bound
(17)) it is possible to show h̄0 (x) > 0. Then, because h̄(s2 ) > 0 and h̄0 (x) > 0, h̄(x) never
crosses zero when x > s2 and the result holds.


Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that firms compete in prices (analogous proof apply in
Cournot-type of games). Variable profits are given by π̃i (vi ) = (pi (vi ) − ci (vi ))qi where
qi is a function of price. Differentiating variable profits with respect to vi


dqi
dpi 0
0
∗
π̃i (vi ) = (pi − ci )
+ qi
c (vi ) − qi c0i (vi )
dpi
dci i
By the Envelop Theorem, the parenthesis above is zero, and π̃i0 (vi ) = −qi c0i (vi ). Taking
the ratio π̃i0 (vi )/π̃i (vi ) and rearranging, we obtain (10).

Proof of Proposition 4. Let pi (q1 , . . . , qne ) be firm i’s price under market structure
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e. Differentiating π̃i (ve ) with respect vi and using the envelope theorem



X dp dqj dqi 


π̃i0 (ve ) = −c0i (vi ) qi 1 −
 = −c0i (vi ) qi (1 + K) > 0
dqj dqi dci 

j∈e−i |{z}|{z}|{z}
(−) (−) (−)

where K is a positive constant summarizing the effect of a change in i’s marginal cost
on the opponents decisions. Under standard assumptions dp/dqj < 0 by downward
sloping demand, dqj /dqi < 0 by strategic substitutes, and dqi /dci < 0 by implicitly
differentiating the firms first order condition. Then, it is not hard to check
π̃i0 (ve )
−c0 (vi ) 1
−c0i (vi ) 1
−c0i (vi ) 1
π̃ 0 (vi )
= (1 + K) i
>
≥
= i
π̃i (ve )
ci (vi ) µ(ve )
ci (vi ) µ(ve )
ci (vi ) µ(vi )
π̃i (vi )
where in the last step µi (vi ) ≥ µi (ve ), markup decreasing with competition, was used. 

B

Auxiliary Results

Lemma 7. Let Hi be defined by (2). For any profile x−i of cutoff strategies by the
competitors, there exist a unique value x̂ such that Hi (x̂, x−i ) = 0.
Proof. We start by showing existence of x̂ using the Intermediate Value Theorem.
Fix x−i and observe that A3 jointly with A2 implies Hi (v i , x−i ) ≤ πi (v i ) < 0. On
the other hand, Lemma 2 implies Hi (x̂, x−i ) ≥ Hi (x̂, −∞−i ). By A3, there exist v̄i
such that Hi (v̄i , −∞−i ) > 0 and, therefore, Hi (v̄i , x−i ) > 0. Then, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem there exist x̂ such that Hi (x̂, x−i ) = 0. For uniqueness, by Lemma 2
∂Hi /∂xi > 0. Therefore Hi (xi , x−i ) single crosses zero.

Lemma 8. Let Hi (xi , xj ) be defined by equation (16). The partial derivatives of Hi with
respect to xi and xj are positive and equal to:


mj −1 
X
∂Hi
mj
=
(mj − k)Fj (xj )mj −k−1 fj (xj )Ei [E[∆i,j (xi , xj )|x, r, k]]
∂xj
k
k=0
(
"
 
mj


∂Hi X
mj
=
Fj (xj )mj −k Ei E[πi0 (xi )|x, r, k]
∂xi
k
k=0
#)

m
i −2 
X
mi − 1
+ fi (xi )
(mi − 1 − r)Fi (xi )mi −2−r E[∆i,i (xi , xi )|x, r, k]
.
r
r=0

Proof. We prove the result for the derivative of Hi with respect to xj . The proof
for the derivative of Hi with respect to xi follows the simmilar steps. Using Leibnitz
differentiation:


mj 
∂Hi X
mj
mj −k−1
=
(mj − k)Fj (xj )
fj (xj )Ei [E[πi (xi )|x, r, k]]
∂xj
k
k=0
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mj 
X
mj
mj −k
(k)Fj (xj )
fj (xj )Ei [E[πi (xi , xj )|x, r, k − 1]]
−
k
k=0

Observe that the first summation becomes zero when k = mj , and that the second
summation becomes zero when k = 0. Changing the second summation’s range to go
from 0 to mj − 1 (instead of going from 1 to mj ) we obtain:


mj −1 
X
∂Hi
mj
mj −k−1
(mj − k)Fj (xj )
fj (xj )Ei [E[πi (xi )|x, r, k]]
=
k
∂xj
k=0
mj −1 

−

X
k=0



mj
(k + 1)Fj (xj )mj −k−1 fj (xj )Ei [E[πi (xi , xj )|x, r, k]] .
k+1

The result follows from using the identity
both expressions.19

mj 
(k
k+1

+ 1) =

mj 
(mj
k

− k) and subtracting


Lemma 9. In a two-group entry model, suppose firms play according to x = (x1 , x2 )
where xi is the cutoff strategy of a firm in group i. Then, for any market structure e ∈ Ei
and j 6∈ e, condition (9) implies:
(mj − k)fi (xi )E[∆i,j (xi , xj )|x, r, k] < Fi (xi )E[πi0 (xi )|x, r, k].

(18)

Proof. Fix market structure e and pick j 6∈ e. Let r be the number of firm in group i
firms entering in e minus one, and let k be the number of j firms entering in e. Rewrite
condition (9) as:
fi (x)∆i,j (x, y, ve )(mj − k) < Fi (x)πi0 (x, ve )
Because condition holds for every x, y and ve , we could integrate on both sides with
respect to any measure and the inequality would be preserved. In particular, because
firms play according to x, for a given market structure e we have that:
Z ∞
∆i,j (xi , xj , ve )φi (ve )dne −1 ve = E[∆i,j (xi , xj )|x, r, k],
{xj }j∈Ii (e)

where r and k are the number of firms (other than i) in group gi and 3 − gi , respectively,
participating in e. Repeating steps with respect to the integral of πi0 (x, ve ) we obtain the
right hand side of (18) and the result follows.


19

For the combinatorial identity simply observe that

m
k+1



(k + 1) is equal to:

m!
m−k
m!
(k + 1)
=
(m − k) =
(k + 1)!(m − k − 1)!
m−k
k!(m − k)!
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(m − k).
k

